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DEFAMATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TORT:
WITH ACTUAL MALICE FOR ALL

Ray Yasser*

If the laws of each age were formulated systematically, no
part of the legal system would be more instructive than the
law relating to defamation. Since the law of defamation professes to protect personal character and public institutions
from destructive attacks, without sacrificing freedom of
thought and the benefit of public discussion, the estimate
formed of the relative importance of these objects, and the
degree of success attained in reconciling them, would be an
admirable measure of the culture, liberality, and practical
ability of each age. Unfortunately, the English law of defamation is not the deliberate product of any period. It is
a mass which has grown by aggregation, with very little
intervention from legislation, and special peculiar circumstances have from time to time shaped its varying course.
The result is that perhaps no other branch of the law is as
open to criticism for its doubts and difficulties, its meaningless and grotesque anomalies. It is, as a whole, absurd in
theory and very often mischievous in its practicaloperation.'
* Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., University of Delaware; J.D., Duke University.
1. Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLUM. L. Rv,
546 (1903) [hereinafter cited as Veeder].
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INTRODUCTION

Of those who have studied defamation, few can disagree with
Veeder's turn-of-the-century observation. The English common law of
defamation was indeed "a forest of complexities . . . inconsistencies

and perverse rigidities with circuitous paths and dead ends for seriously
wronged plaintiffs."2 Unfortunately, many of the pitfalls remain with
us today.
The maze of common law defamation was transported from
England to the United States in the eighteenth century. Although federal and state judges bravely attempted to render the law intelligible,
the more realistic among them found a "fog of fictions, inferences and
presumptions."3 Those who insisted that the maze was understandable found clear cases of "slander which is libelous per se . .

.-

Few emerged with all faculties intact. The result was that although
our judges struggled to find their way through the common law
labyrinth, they succeeded only in hammering out false or partial
passageways which only added to the confusion.
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court boldly entered
America's legal equivalent of the Gardens at Versailles. The Court has
been thrashing about ever since, albeit with an air of confidence. For
the fruits of its labor, the Court can honestly lay claim to having created
some.of the most perplexing of the labyrinth's putative passageways.;
There is a twofold purpose for writing this article. First, the
author hopes to offer as clear a picture of the defamation maze as
possible. To avoid becoming lost in its corridors, the approach taken
by this article is somewhat detached. Value judgments are avoided
wherever possible-res ipsa loquitur. In order to present a clear and
accurate picture, it is of course important to distinguish new additions
to the maze from those which have been around for some time. Therefore, the common law of defamation is described at the outset. From
this vantage point, the impact of the Supreme Court cases is discussed.
From there, the magnificent structure in its entirety is briefly surveyed.
2. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1349 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Eaton].
3. - Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 740, 98 P. 281, 291 (1908).
4. Douglas v. Janis, 43 Cal. App. 3rd 931, 941, 118 Cal. Rptr. 280, 286 (1974).
5.- See notes 46-98 infra and accompanying text.
6. Many authorities have been critical of this area of the law. See, e.g., NV. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971); Courtney, Absurdities of
the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 AM. L. REV.552 (1902); Veeder, History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 4 CoLuM. L. Rav. 33 (1904).
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The second and primary purpose of the article is to voice a plea for
a more rational approach to the tort of defamation; for guidance in finding a way out of the maze. Judges, torts professors, lawyers and litigants in defamation cases are, after all, not Minotaurs. A fair balancing of one's right to be free from injury to reputation with another's
right to speak freely can be better accomplished outside the maze.
Only there can a degree of success be achieved in reconciling these
important competing interests commensurate with the "culture, liberality and practical ability"7 of the technological age that is peculiarly
our own.
PROFILE OF THE TORT OF DEFAMATION AT
COMMON LAW

The Plaintiff'sPrimaFacieCase-A Strict Liability Tort
The tort of defamation, as it existed at common law, can be
defined as the unconsented to and unprivileged intentional communication to a third person of a false statement about the plaintiff which
tends to harm the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of the community." Consent and privilege are affirmative defenses that must be
Once defamatory meaning
pleaded and proved by the defendant.
is apparent, injury to reputation is generally presumed as a matter of
law. 10 Moreover, the plaintiff is given the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the statement is false, thus making truth a defense to
be pleaded and proved by the defendant. 1 Therefore, the plaintiff's
prima facie case consists of a simple allegation that the defendant intentionally communicated to a third person a statement about the plaintiff which tended to expose the plaintiff to "public hatred, shame,
obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, de12
gradation or disgrace.'
7. Veeder, supra note 1, at 546.
8. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBoOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, 766-72 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PtossER]. Although no such definition is offered by Prosser, a fair reading of the cases and authorities indicates that this definition is essentially
accurate and complete, though admittedly awkward.
9. Id. § 114, at 784.
10. Id. § 112, at 754.
11. Id. § 116, at 796.
12. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186 N.E. 217;
218 (1933); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 559 (1938) [hereinafter cited as RESrATEMENT].
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It should be noted that the tort of defamation is in substance one
of strict liability.' 3 That is to say, the only intent that is required is

the intent to communicate something to a third person.' 4 In the vast
majority of cases, of course, the defendant clearly intends to communi-

cate something to a third person even though she may not intend to
defame or harm the plaintiff. In fact, it appears that the only type of
case where the courts are willing to concede that the requisite intent

to communicate is lacking involves situations analogous to that where
the defendant is alone with the plaintiff, defaming her to her face, and
an unanticipated intruder overhears the defamatory utterance.Yr
As to all other matters which conceivably could be either intended
or negligently performed, the defendant is strictly accountable.'0 It
thus makes absolutely no difference that the defendant does not intend
to lie, defame or harm the plaintiff. Likewise, it is immaterial that the

defendant does not negligently lie, defame, or harm the plaintiff. The
defamer, in short, is strictly liable for whatever she intentionally communicates to a third person about the plaintiff if it turns out that what
she said is false, injures the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the com-

munity, and is neither consented to by the plaintiff nor privileged. At
common law, one communicates virtually at her peril. The printed and
written word is, in a legal sense, indistinguishable from nitro-glycerin

and dangerous animals-if someone is hurt by use of it, liability
attaches.'

7

The Libel/SlanderPer Se/Per Quad Distinctions

Common law defamation consists of the two torts of libel and
slander. Libel is written or printed defamation---defamation em13. See, e.g., Coleman v. McClennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908); Cassidy v.
Daily Mirror Newspapers Lmtd. [1929] 2 K.B. 331; E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1909]
2 K.B. 444 (C.A.), af'd. [1910] A.C. 20; Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B.C. 247 (1825).
14. Id.
15. Joel Eaton observes that "historically, the law of defamation has been characterized by a strict liability as severe as anything found in the law." Eaton, supra note 2,
at 1352. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at § 577, Comment n; NV. PRossER,
TORTS 604 (2d ed. 1955); Note, Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 11mW. L.
REv. 875, 902-03 (1956). Many commentators have concluded that negligent communication to a third person, or negligent publication, is enough.
16. PRossER, supra note 8, at 771; RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, at §§ 579-580.
17. See, e.g., Switzer v. Anthony, 71 Colo. 291, 206 P. 391 (1922) (defendant did
not even know of plaintiff's existence); Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 40 So.
376 (1906) (intended to praise plaintiff rather than defame him); Corrigan v. BobbsMerrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920) (use of name believed to be fictitious);
E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 444 (C.A.), afjd. [1910] A.C. 20.
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bodied in some tangible or permanent form and therefore generally
subject to wide dissemination.' 8 Slander is oral defamation-fleeting
and ephemeral and therefore generally not subject to wide dissemina-

tion. 19 , Any libel which is clearly defamatory, with no need to resort
to extrinsic facts20 to show the defamatory meaning, is said to be actionable per se. 2' The phrase "actionable per se" means that general dam-

age to reputation will be presumed. Slander is actionable per se only
if the slanderer says that the plaintiff: (1) committed a crime of moral

turpitude; or (2) has venereal disease or something equally loathsome
and communicable; or (3) is somehow unfit or not to be trusted in her

occupation; or (4) is not chaste. 22
A libel not actionable per se is actionable per quod. 21 The phrase
"actionable per quod" means that there is no presumption of general
damage to reputation and that the plaintiff must plead and prove "special damages," usually of a pecuniary nature. 4

Libel per quod exists

when the defamatory statement is innocent on its face but takes on a
defamatory meaning when illuminated by proof of extrinsic facts.25
18. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 111, at 737.
19. Most states treat defamation by the electronic media as. libel since it is subject
to wide dissemination. Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1311 (1973). Georgia has created a third
category for electronically broadcast defamation called "defamacast." American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, -, 126 S.E.2d 873, 879
(1972). Prasser criticizes the concept of "defamacast" as "a barbarous new word."
PROSSER, supra note 8,§ 112, at 753.
20. See footnote 25 infra.
21. PROSSER,supra note 8, § 112 at 762.
22. Id. at 754-60. The fourth category is relevant only in regard to statements
made of or concerning females. Some commentators suggest the existence of a fifth,
peculiarly American, category of imputations of communist affiliation.
23. Id. at 763.
24. Id. at 760.
25. The English common law provided that all libel was actionable without proof
of special damages. If a statement was not defamatory on its face, it was labelled libel
per quod and extrinsic facts had to be pleaded to make out the defamatory meaning.
The extrinsic facts had to be pleaded by way of "inducement," "innuendo" or "colloquium."
If the defamatory meaning could be established only by reference to facts not apparent upon the face of the publication, the plaintiff had to show such facts by way of
"inducement." The purpose of the requirement called "innuendo" was to explain the
meaning of the words in light of the facts. So, for example, a false statement that the
plaintiff had given birth to twins was not defamatory on its face since there was nothing
there that would hold the plaintiff up to scorn or ridicule; but when it was pleaded by
way of inducement that she was married one week at the time of the birth and by way
of innuendo (for the slow to catch on) that she must have had premarital intercourse,
a defamatory statement was made out. See Morrison v. Ritchie and Co., [1901-19021
Sess. Cas. 645 (Scot. 2d Div.), 39 Scot. L. Rptr. 432 (1902).
If the publication on its face made no reference to the plaintiff, the plaintiff had
to sustain the burden of pleading and proof by way of "colloquium" that the defamatory
statement was of and concerning her. So, for example, if the defamatory statement was
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Libel per quod, however, can be magically transformed to libel per se

if it -turns out that the defamatory statement as illuminated by extrinsic
26
facts falls within one of the four classes of slander actionable per se.
Slander which does not fall into one of the four categories is only ac27
tionable per quod.
The requirement that the plaintiff plead and prove special pecuniary damages in cases which are only actionable per quod often proves

to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. 28 If, however, the plaintiff is
successful in showing special pecuniary damage, general damages are

then appropriate for presumed reputational injury along with non-pecuniary special damages, such as emotional distress or physical illness.
Available Defenses

Assuming that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the
defendant may escape liability by establishing that what was communicated was true or that what was communicated was either absolutely
or conditionally privileged. 29 Truth is a complete defense if the de-

fendant can show that the imputation is substantially true.30 Generally,
the defendant need not show literal truth but must establish that what

was communicated was basically true as to the "sting" of the libel.31
Truth is generally a total defense regardless of the motives.32

Belief

as to truth, however honest though it may be, is no justification for de33
famation.
that "the person in the 'A' frame house next to John Smith's house is an adulterer," the
plaintiff would have to plead and prove extrinsic facts, by way of colloquium, that the
defamatory statement was about her.
The addition of a special damage requirement to the libel per quod category apparently began because of confusion with the "per se" terminology already in the law of
slander. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 2, at 1355. In any event, it now seems to be well
established in the United States that special damages must be pleaded and proven in
some cases of libel per quod. The authorities are in disagreement however as to what
extrinsic facts may serve to illuminate the statement so that it is termed actionable only
upon proof of special damages.
26. See, e.g., Broking v. Phoenix Newspapers, 76 Ariz. 334, 264 P.2d 413 (1953);
Thompson v. Upton, 218 Md. 453, 146 A.2d 880 (1958); note 25 supra.
27. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 112, at 754-62.
28. See generally Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy-The Requirement of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. L REv. 1 (1972).
29. PROSSER, supra note 8, §§ 114-116.
30. Florida Pub. Co. v. Lee, 76 Fla. 405, 80 So. 245 (1918); but see White v. White,
129 Va. 621, 106 S.E. 350 (1921).
31. See, e.g., Bell Pub. Co. v. Garrett Eng. Co., 154 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
32. C. GREcORY & H. KALVEN, TORTS 1025 n.8 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
KALVEN].

33. See, e.g., Fountain v. West, 23 Iowa 9 (1867) discussed in KALvEN, supra note
32, at 1022 n.3.
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Privilege, like truth, is a complete defense if established by the

defendant. 34 The rationale for the existence of privilege as a defense

is that conduct which may otherwise impose liability is excusable in
cases where the defendant is acting in furtherance of some socially use-

ful interest.3 5 That is to say, it is more desirable, from a social standpoint, to protect the defendant and allow the plaintiff to go uncompensated. If an absolute privilege is found to exist, the defendant is totally
immune from liability. Absolute privilege arises when the defendant

is acting in furtherance of some very important social interest; an interest so important that the court is willing to immunize the defendant

from liability for false statements without regard to purpose, motive or
reasonableness. Absolute privilege is confined to the few situations
where there are obvious strong policy reasons in favor of permitting

unbridled speech. 36 Thus, statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged.87

Similarly, statements made in

the course of legislative proceedings are absolutely privileged. 38 Execu-

tive communications, arguably made in the discharge of official
duties, are likewise absolutely privileged. 9 The media is absolutely
privileged for defamation uttered by political candidates who have been
40

granted equal time under the Federal Communications Act.
The more common situation involves a claim of qualified privilege.
Qualified privilege arises in situations where the defendant is arguably
justified in talking. It is somewhat difficult to define qualified privi-

lege with any degree of precision; the cases reveal repeated reliance
on Baron Parke's formulation that a statement is privileged when it is

"fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public and private
34. See note 29 supra.
35. For a complete discussion of this policy, see Harper, Privileged Defamation,
22 VA. L. REV. 642 (1936); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv.
413 (1910).
36. For a general discussion of absolute privilege, see PRossER, supra note 8, § 114.
37. This absolute immunity extends to all statements made in the course of the proceedings if arguably relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings: Irwin v. Murphy,
129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933) (the jurors); McDavitt v. Boyer, 169 Ill.
475,
48 N.E. 317 (1897) (counsel); Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842
(1963) (the judge); Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W.2d 1065 (1943)
(parties to the litigation); Nadeau v. Texas Co., 104 Mont. 558, 69 P.2d 586 (1937)
(the published judicial opinions); Massey v. Jones, 182 Va. 200, 28 S.E.2d 623 (1944)
(witnesses).
38. The legislative privilege extends to all statements made by the legislators and
to printed records of the proceedings. Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1956); Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L.R. Ir.600 (1887).
39. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
40. Farmer's Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of one's own affairs
in matters where his interest is concerned.""' The immunity conferred
on the defendant is conditioned on her good behavior; the defendant
must act properly or else the privilege is defeated. In general, a qualified privilege is defeated by the existence of facts inconsistent with the
purpose of the privilege.42 The common law qualified privilege includes the privilege to fairly comment on matters of public concern by
offering opinion, but not false statement of fact, 48 and to fairly and
44
accurately report public proceedings.

This is the oversimplified, yet mind-boggling, common law maze
that the Supreme Court ventured into in 1964 to determine the extent
to which the first amendment limits a state's power to award damages
in a libel action.45
THE MATRIX OF RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CASES
46

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

In March of 1960, L.B. Sullivan was one of three elected Commissioners to the City of Montgomery, Alabama. As such, he
supervised the Montgomery Police Department, Fire Department, Department of Cemetery and Department of Scales. On March 29, 1960,
the New York Times ran a full page advertisement entitled "Heed

Their Rising Voices."

The advertisement stated that thousands of

Southern blacks, engaged in a non-violent effort to secure constitution41. See, e.g., Watt v. Longsdon, [1930] 1 K.B. 130.
42. The privilege is defeated if the defendant steps outside the scope of the privilege
or abuses the occasion by making statements that are malicious or by making statements
with knowledge of falsity or with no reasonable belief that they are true. See, e.g., Cook
v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326, 357, 145 S.W. 480, 490 (1912). "Malicious" in this
regard is defined as "ill will" or acting with bad motives. Brewer v. Second Baptist
Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948); Joseph v. Baars, 142 Wisc. 390, 125 N.W.
913 (1910). The privilege is also abused if defendant "over-publishes" the statement
instead of using some less public alternative. Moyle v. Franz, 293 N.Y. 842, 59 N.E.2d
437 (1944) (use of newspaper); Logan v. Hodges, 146 N.C. 38, 59 S.E. 349 (1907)
(defamatory message on post card); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Nance, 165 Va. 363,
182 S.E. 264 (1935) (speaking so that he would be overheard).
43. Because a false statement of fact is not privileged as an "opinion" or "fair comment," the authorities are in disagreement as to whether it is a true privilege. See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1363 n.52. Dean Prosser calls the privilege "fair comment" and
cites the majority position as protecting only opinion and the minority position as extending to false statements of fact as well as opinions. PRossna, supra note 8, § 115, at
785-92 and § 118, at 819.
44. PRossER, supra note 8,§ 115, at 792.
45. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. Id.
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ally protected rights, were being met by an "unprecedented wave of
terror," perpetuated by "Southern Violators," designed to prevent them
from enjoying their constitutional rights. The Montgomery police were
implicated on a number of occasions as "Southern Violators."
It was uncontroverted that some statements in the advertisement
were not accurate descriptions of events which occurred in Montgomery. The text of the advertisement concluded with an appeal for
funds and appeared over the names of sixty-four persons, many widely
known for accomplishments in religion, public affairs, trade unions and
the performing arts. L.B. Sullivan sued the New York Times and four
black Alabama clergymen who signed the advertisement. A Montgomery County jury found that Sullivan was defamed and awarded him
one-half million dollars, the full amount claimed, against all the defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed 7 and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari "because of the importance of the Constitutional
48
issues involved.
Although the Alabama law that was applied in New York Times,
both at the trial level and appellate level, did not differ significantly
from the profile of the tort of defamation at common law already described, the Supreme Court, with Justice Brennan writing the majority
opinion, held
that the rule of law applied by the Alabama Courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for
freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought
by a public official against critics of his official conduct.4 9
The Court went on to say that the evidence presented in the case was
"constitutionally insufficient" to support the judgment for the respondent.8 0 The common law then, according to the Supreme Court, was
inherently constitutionally defective.
The Supreme Court considered the New York Times case "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."'" The
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
376 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 270.
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Court quoted Judge Learned Hand to the effect that the first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues than through any kind of authoritative
selection" and that although "[t]o many this is . . .folly" we have
nonetheless, as a society, "staked upon it our all." 52 In view of this
national commitment to robust wide-open debate, Justice Brennan
reasoned "that erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and that
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
'breathing space' that they 'need . . .to survive . . .' ., Brennan
cited Judge Edgerton for the simple truth that "whatever is added to
the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate."5 4
The Court then constructed legal rules to ensure that our national
commitment was not compromised. According to the Court, the Constitution requires
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
"actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.55
Moreover, the aggrieved official must prove "actual malice" with "convincing clarity"-a standard of proof which is arguably more demanding
than proof by a mere preponderance of evidence.56
Thus was born the constitutional privilege in defamation cases.
of the privilege, it should be noted, was
The original and exclusive owner 57
government.
of
critic"
the "citizen
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Its Companion, Associated Press
v. Walker' s
Three years after the landmark New York Times decision, a
majority of the Supreme Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to defamatory criticism of "public figures." Although Mr. Justice
Harlan announced the result in both Butts and Walker, a majority of
the Court agreed with Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion in his con52. 376 U.S. at 270, quoting Learned Hand in United States v. Associated Press,
52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

376 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 285-86.
But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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curring opinion5 9 that the New York Times test would apply to criticism
of "public figures" in addition to "public officials."'60 The Court's extension of the constitutional privilege to defamatory criticism of "public
figures" made the New York Times privilege available to those who
defamed people "intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions" or who "by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large." 61
The Butts case originated with an article in the Saturday Evening
Post accusing Wally Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. At
the time of the article, Butts was the athletic director of the University
of Georgia. The article accused Butts of giving team secrets to the
opposition. Butts brought a libel action in federal court against Curtis
Publishing Co., the publisher of the Saturday Evening Post, seeking
$5,000,000 compensatory and $5,000,000 punitive damages. At trial,
the defendant relied on the defense of truth. The jury returned a verdict for $60,000 in general damages and $3,000,000 in punitive damages.
The court reduced the total award to $460,000 by remittitur.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed6 3 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the decision.
The Walker case, the companion case to Butts, arose out of the
distribution of a news story giving an eyewitness account of events on
the campus of the University of Mississippi on the night of the now
infamous riot which erupted as a consequence of federal efforts to enforce a judicial decree ordering the enrollment of James Meredith as
the first black student at the university. The story stated that General
Walker, a retired career soldier and staunch segregationist, personally
led a charge against the federal marshalls' attempt to carry out the court
order. Walker sued the Associated Press in the Texas state courts and
asked for $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Walker
denied taking part in any "charge" against federal officials. Although
the Associated Press defended on the basis of truth, a verdict of
$500,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages was
returned. The trial judge, however, refused to enter the punitive
award on the grounds that there was no evidence of "actual malice."
59. Id. at 162.
60. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336 n.7 (1974), which provides
the scorecard without which one can't tell the players.
61. 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, CJ., concurring).
62. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 225 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
63. Curtis Publ. Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
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Both sides appealed and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.
After the Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiroari and reversed.
The rationale used by the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion
was that "differentiation between 'public figures' and 'public officials'
. . has no basis in law, logic or First Amendment policy."6 4 The
same test should apply both to the public figure plaintiff and public
official plaintiff; each must show "actual malice" in order to recover. "[W]alker was a public man in whose public conduct society
and the press had a legitimate and substantial interest." 65 Because he
did not prove actual malice, Walker could not recover. Butts too was
a public figure. Unlike Walker, however, Butts proved "actual
malice," since the jury's punitive damage award was preceded by an
instruction that such an award was appropriate only if "actual malice"
was found. Butts, then, could recover. The result is that the privilege
which once belonged only to the "citizen critic of government" is extended to the "citizen critic" of the public person.
*

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.0 6
Approximately four years after Butts and Walker, the Supreme
Court took the New York Times privilege one logical step further.
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, concluded in Rosenbloom
that the New York Times protection should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the statements concerned matters
of general or public interest.
George Rosenbloom was a distributor of "nudist magazines" in the
Philadelphia metropolitan area. During an obscenity crackdown, he
was arrested for selling allegedly obscene material as he was making
a delivery to a retail dealer. A few days after the arrest, the police
obtained a search warrant to search Rosenbloom's home and warehouse
and seized Rosenbloom's allegedly obscene inventory. Rosenbloom,
who by this time was out on bail, was again arrested. Following the
second arrest, a,Metromedia Inc. radio broadcast included an item
about Rosenbloom. The report broadcasted stated that obscene materials had been confiscated at Rosenbloom's home.
64. 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
65. Id. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
66. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss4/1

12

Yasser: Defamation As a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malice for All
19771

THE LAW OF DEFAMATION

Rosenbloom then sued various city and police officials and several
local news media alleging that the material seized was not obscene.
Rosenbloom asked for injunctive relief prohibiting further police
harrassment as well as further publicity of the arrests. Metromedia,
in turn, reported that "girlie book peddlers" in the "smut literature
racket" were seeking judicial relief. Rosenbloom, however, was not
mentioned by name. Rosenbloom subsequently was acquitted of the
criminal obscenity charged on the grounds that his magazines were not
obscene. Following the acquittal, he filed a libel suit in federal district court, alleging that Metromedia's unqualified characterizations of
his books as "obscene" and of him as a "girlie book peddler" in the
"smut literature racket" were defamatory and constituted libel per se.
At trial, Metromedia's defenses were truth and privilege. After
receiving instructions which did not apply the New York Times privilege, but clearly articulated common law rules, the jury returned a verdict for Rosenbloom and awarded him $25,000 in general damages and
$725,000 in punitive damages.6 7 The trial court then reduced the
punitive damage award to $250,000 on remittitur. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, reversed, holding that judgment be
entered for Metromedia because Rosenbloom's evidence did not reasonably support the conclusion that Metromedia had acted with "actual
malice' as constitutionally defined. 68 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 9
In affirming the lower appellate court, the Supreme Court in
Rosenbloom extended the constitutional privilege to protect defamatory
falsehoods concerning "private persons" if the statements concerned
matters of "general or public interest." The Court focused on society's
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a subject of
public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely
because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the
individual did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved." 70 "Private
individuals involved in an event of public interest '71 are the legal
equivalents of "public officials" and "public figures." All have to
prove "actual malice" to recover in a defamation action.
67. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
68. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).

69. 403 U.S. at 29.
70. Id. at 43.
71. Id. at 31.
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The Court went on to carefully analyze the role of the free press,
the public's right to know, and the importance of the first amendment,
concluding that the constitutional protection extended "to all discussion
and communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous."7 2 The critical inquiry concerns the subject matter of the
discussion.73
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 4
By 1974, hundreds of post-New York Times defamation cases had
been before the courts. The results of this avalanche of litigation was
a continuing struggle to find the appropriate balance between the rights
of free speech and press and the right to be free from character attacks.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,75 the Supreme Court reversed the trend
by severely limiting, if not overruling, Rosenbloom.
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a
youth named Nelson. The policeman was subsequently found guilty
of second degree murder by state prosecutors. The Nelson family retained Elmer Gertz to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio.
Robert Welch published American Opinion, a monthly periodical
of the John Birch Society. The magazine had long warned of a nationwide conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies and create
a national police force supporting a communist dictatorship. As a part
of his effort to alert the public, Welch commissioned and published an
article on the policeman's murder trial. In the article, Gertz was portrayed as a communist official with a criminal record. Statements made
in the article contained serious factual inaccuracies.
Gertz filed an action for libel in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois,"0 alleging injury to his reputation
as a lawyer and citizen. Welch claimed that he was entitled to the constitutional privilege and asked for summary judgment on the grounds that
Gertz would not be able to show "actual malice." The court denied
the motion, concluding that Gertz might be able to prove "actual
malice." After all the evidence was heard, the district court ruled that
Gertz was not a public figure or public official and therefore did not
72. Id. at 44.
73. Id.

74. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
75. Id.
76. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 310 (ND. Ill.
1969).
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have to prove "actual malice" to recover. The case was submitted to
the jury and the jury determined that the appropriate measure of damages was $50,000.
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, the district
court entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict,
anticipating the Rosenbloom decision. 7 The district court concluded
that discussion of a public issue was constitutionally protected, that
Welch's statements pertained to a public issue, and that Gertz had not
met the New York Times "actual malice' standard. 7 The Rosenbloom decision intervened and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit then agreed with the district court and affirmed its
judgment, citing Rosenbloom. 79 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional
privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen and
80
reversed.
The Supreme Court in Gertz carefully reviewed the development
of the law of defamation through New York Times and Rosenbloom
in light of the competing interests of free speech and press and of protecting an individual's reputation. The Court recognized the critical
importance of free speech and press to robust debate; the Court also
recognized that "absolute protection for the communications media
would require a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the
law of defamation"' 1 and that the "legitimate state interest underlying
the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted
on them by defamatory falsehood. 8' 2 Balancing the interests, the
Court concluded that the protection afforded the media under Rosenbloom was too broad: "Mhe extension of the New York Times test
proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate
state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable."8' 3
Thus the "public or general interest" test for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard was rejected as inadequately serving the competing values at stake. The Supreme Court
concluded that the states should retain substantial latitude in their
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 346.
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efforts to fashion a remedy for defamatory falsehoods about private individuals 4 and that so long as liability was not imposed without fault,
the states could define for themselves the appropriate standard of liabil8 5

ity.

To guard against the states using their new latitude to intrude
upon the first amendment, the Court then stated the requirement that
state proscribed remedies "reach no farther than is necessary to protect
the legitimate interest involved" and concluded that "[i]t is necessary
to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury."' 0
Thus, presumed or punitive damages cannot be recovered by the
private plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding
standard than New York Times.
The Court then turned its attention to the continuing dilemma of
the "public person" as plaintiff. The Gertz Court endorsed its prior
decisions in Butts and Walker and sought to further define the status
of a public figure. Under Gertz, a public figure designation may rest
on either of two alternatives:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
special
range of issues. In either case such persons assume
87
prominence in the resolution of public questions.
For the second category-public people for a limited range of issues
-it "[i]s preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more
meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation."8 Public people in general enjoy "significantly greater access to
the 'channels' of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy." 9 They typically also "invite attention and
comment."' 00 In contrast, "private individuals are not only more
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

345-46.
347.
349.
351.
352.
344.
345.
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vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are
also more deserving of recovery."9 1
The Court concluded that Gertz was a private person and that the
New York Times standard was not applicable. Because the jury was
allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume
damages without proof of actual injury, a new trial was ordered by the
Court. 92
93
Time, Inc. v. Firestone

Less than two years later, in 1976, the Supreme Court added yet
another link to the chain of defamation cases that began 12 years
earlier with New York Times v. Sullivan. This time the Court was
called upon to refine its definition of "public figure."
In 1964, Mary Alice Firestone and Russell Firestone sought the
dissolution of their marriage in Florida. Since Russell was heir to one
of America's wealthiest industrial fortunes, the proceeding drew a great
deal of attention in the Miami press.9" After judgment in the divorce
proceeding was rendered, Time Magazine printed an item under its
"Milestones" section, which stated that Russell Firestone had been
granted a divorce based on the grounds of extreme cruelty and
adultery. The article characterized the marriage as having "enough
extramarital adventures on both sides to make Dr. Freud's hair curl."9 5
Within a few weeks of publication, Mary Alice Firestone demanded a retraction from Time. When the magazine refused, a libel
action was commenced against it in Florida circuit court. A jury ultimately awarded Ms. Firestone $100,000 in damages. The decision
was reviewed by the Florida District Court of Appeals, 9 6 and ultimately
affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. 97 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 1975.98
91. Id.
92. The Gertz decision, according to some commentators, applies only to media defendants. A leading proponent of this view is Joel Eaton. Since Justice Powell, writing
for the majority in Gertz, refers to the defendant randomly as a publisher, a newspaper,
a broadcaster, media, communications media, news media, broadcast media and the
press, this view is not without merit. No express limitation upon the holding to media
defendants is stated. Lower courts that have dealt with the problem have refused to recognize a distinction between media and non-media defendants. See Eaton, supra note
2, at 1416 n.271 for a reference to the appropriate lower court cases.
93. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
94. Id. at 485.
95. Id. at 450.
96. 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
97. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).

98. 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
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Time, Inc. contended that as a publisher it was entitled to the New
York Times conditional privilege and thus could not be found liable
unless it was established that the article was published with "actual
malice." In support of this contention, Time argued that Ms. Firestone
was a "public figure" and that the proceeding was of "a class of subject
matter which .

.

. deserves the protection of the 'actual malice'

'
standard."99
The Supreme Court rejected both propositions.
The Court applied the Gertz criteria for defining a public figure
and found that Ms. Firestone did not attain this status; "[r]espondent
did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society
. ..and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular

public controversy.

...."10

The Court explained that Ms. Firestone

did not voluntarily enter the public spotlight or freely choose to publicize issues concerning her married life. She had to use the courts
to obtain a divorce. Time's attempt to "equate 'public controversy'
with all controversies of interest to the public" failed. 101 The Court
noted that "[w]ere we to accept this reasoning, we would reinstate the
doctrine advanced in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc."'102

Despite the fact that the Firestone Court rejected the argument
that the New York Times privilege should extend to the Time publisher, the Court nevertheless refused to affirm the Florida court and
remanded the case for readjudication. The Court noted that the record
did not indicate evidence of fault on the part of the defendant charged
with publishing the defamatory material. Since "Gertz established
• . .that not only must there be evidence to support an award of compensatory damages, there must also be evidence of some fault on the
part of a defendant,"'0 3 the Court had no choice but to remand for
further proceedings.
THE LABYRINTH AFTER FIRESTONE

Gertz fundamentally altered the labyrinth. As Justice White
remarked, "[11est there be any mistake about it, the changes wrought
by the Court's decision cut very deeply."' 0 4 No area of the common
law maze is unaffected. The most important lines of delineation are
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 461.
418 U.S. 323, 371 (1974) (White, L,dissenting).
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public plaintiffs and private plaintiffs. It may also be important to distinguish media from non-media defendants. A consideration of the
possible litigant combinations reveals the rough outline of the new
maze.
Gertz makes it clear that a public person suing a mass media
defendant must show "actual malice" to recover. Gertz also makes it
clear that a private person suing a mass media defendant must show
fault and actual injury to recover. But because of the ambiguity in
Gertz, a public plaintiff suing a non-media defendant doesn't know
what she has to prove to recover. It is simply not clear whether Gertz
is limited to cases involving media defendants or applies as well to nonmedia speakers. 10 5
If Gertz is limited to the media, a public person, inparticular kinds
of suits against a non-media speaker, will be entitled to recover on a
common law strict liability theory. For example, if a non-media defendant speaks privately about the private life of a public person, constitutional limitations on liability are inapposite. If Gertz applies to
non-media speakers, a public person would presumably have to show
"actual malice" to recover.
A private person suing a non-media defendant faces a similar
dilemma. If Gertz is limited to the media, the private person is entitled
to rely on a common law strict liability theory in suits against non-media
speakers. If Gertz applies to non-media speakers, then arguably the
private plaintiff must show at least fault and actual injury.
If all of this sounds to you like so much hocus-pocus, take heart:
you are not alone. The fact is that nobody, with the possible exception
of the Supreme Court Justices, knows what Gertz means. A clear
outline of the labyrinth will not be perceptible until the Court clarifies
its approach to defamation problems. A suggested approach follows.
DEFAMATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL TORT:
WITH ACTuAL MALICE FOR ALL

In 1967 Harry Kalven made this observation concerning the
potential of New York Times as a precedent: "If it is applied across
the board in these cases, it retains its salience as a key precedent
and it gives the Court a touchstone for the future; if the standard is
nibbled away, a promising starting point for analysis of future problems
105. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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is wasted."' 10 6 The reference here to Kalven's observation is the starting point for a suggested analysis which does not discriminate between
public-people-plaintiffs and private-people-plaintiffs and which does
not discriminate between media defendants and non-media defendants.
In this analysis, the first amendment protects the right to communicate
about people. A communicator is only liable if she communicates a
defamatory statement with "actual malice." Thus, in this analysis,
every person has a constitutional privilege to communicate thoughts
about people. The New York Times privilege is the touchstone, to
be applied across the board, rather than nibbled away,
The PublicPlaintiff/PrivatePlaintiffDistinction
The Court in Gertz makes it abundantly clear that one critical
determination to be made in defamation cases is whether the plaintiff
is a public person. The justifications for the distinction are that public
people invite comment about themselves and have access to the media
and are therefore less deserving of recovery and less vulnerable to injury than private people.
The rationale of the first justification is that the public person
voluntarily assumes the risk, inherent in public life, that she may be
burned by the public spotlight. 0 7 In a sense, then, the constitutional privilege is merely an assumption of risk defense in federal disguise."'' 0 8 But is it fair to say that a public person voluntarily assumes
the known risk of character assassination? Justice Brennan, dissenting
in Gertz, thought that:
Mhe idea that certain 'public figures' have voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection while private
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public
view is, at best, a legal fiction. In any event, such a distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening
discussion of issues of public or general concern because they
happen to involve private citizens while extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of lives of 'pubthat are not in the area of public or general conlic figures'
09
cern.1
Even though the Court emphasized the notion of voluntary exposure, it recognized that one could become a public person involun106.
107.
108.
109.

KALVBN, supra note

32, at 1269.

See Eaton, supranote 2, at 1420.
Id.
418 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tarily: "Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances
of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."'11 The
"exceedingly rare" case presumably would include the cases of one
who is a relative of a famous person and one who is a victim or passive participant in an event of public interest. In any event, by acknowledging that there may be such a person as an involuntary public
person, it appears that access to the media alone can be sufficient to
classify one as a public person.
The second justification, that the public person has access to the
media and therefore is less vulnerable to injury because of her opportunity to rebut the charges, fails to comport with reality in at least two
fundamental ways. To begin with, it is not entirely accurate to say
that the public person has superior access to the media. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"' decided contemporaneously with Gertz,
suggests the opposite. In that case, the Court held that a Florida statute
that granted a political candidate a "right of reply" to answer newspaper attacks on his record was unconstitutional because it violated
the first amendment guarantee of a free press. The clear implication
of Tornillo is that a public person who is defamed by the media has
no legal right to reply through the media. Secondly, it is entirely
unclear whether access to the media is an effective self-help remedy
to a defamatory statement. It is a well known truism that the truth
rarely catches up with the lie. Moreover, one who proclaims innocence in the face of a false charge about her may well be thought to
protest too much. Indeed, the Court recognized in Tornillo that access
to the media is often not an effective remedy:
Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches
up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of reto its task does not mean
buttal, standing alone, is inadequate
11 2
that it is irrelevant to our inquiry.
The Court did not go on in Tornillo to indicate how it is relevant to
our inquiry. However, the Court in Gertz did go on to explain that:
Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of
society, an individual should not be deemed a public person110. Id. at 345.
111. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
112. 418 U.S. at 344 n.9.
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ality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the
public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation
in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 11
Just what this means is entirely unclear.
We do know that the public person designation may rest on either
of two alternative bases. According to the Court, one may achieve
such a degree of fame or notoriety that she becomes a public person
for all purposes. In the vast majority of cases, however, the Court
states that a person is a public person for a limited range of issues. If,
as suggested, one must look to the particular controversy to make the
public person determination in the vast majority of cases, then it
appears that the Rosenbloom analysis has been retained.
This is so because the Court states that in evaluating the nature
and extent of an individual's involvement in a controversy for the purpose of determining whether that person is a public person, the critical
factor to be considered is whether the individual has "thrust himself
into the vortex of this public issue

. . .

in an attempt to influence its

outcome." '
That is to say, although participation in a public issue
is "not exactly a twin sister of Rosenbloom's 'involvement in a matter
of public concern,'

. . .

the two concepts are close enough to be first

cousins."'1 5 Somewhat ironically, the Court in Gertz said it was
abandoning Rosenbloom because:
The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the
Rosenbloom plurality would abridge.

. .

legitimate state in-

terest[s] to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it
would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and
federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public interest" and which
do not-to determine, in the words of Mr. Justice Marshall,
"what information is relevant to self government." We
doubt the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience
8
of judges."1
As Justice Marshall himself observed in Firestone, the Court was on
the one hand rejecting the propriety of judicial inquiry into the
legitimacy of interest in a particular subject while sanctifying it on the
other with its public figure analysis.'1
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 352.
Id. (emphasis added).
Eaton, supra note 2, at 1423.
418 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted).
Id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The point is that it is just not possible under any analysis to determine public person status without determining whether the relevant
issue is a public issue. Public person status, quite simply, depends to
a large degree on whether the issue the person is involved in is categorized as a public issue, public controversy, or matter of public concern. If in fact this is so, and it is not possible to determine public
person status without determining whether an issue is a public issue,
then the Court has done nothing more than indirectly commit to the
conscience of judges a task that it believes cannot be appropriately performed by the judiciary.. In a roundabout fashion, the Court is determining what information is relevant to self-government-an admittedly
dangerous practice. The better approach would be to simply protect
communications about people without endeavoring to give special protection to communications about "public people."
The MedialNon-MediaDistinction
When the Supreme Court in New York Times determined "for
the first time the extent to which the Constitutional protections for
speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel
action brought by a public official,"' 1 s no mention was made of a distinction between the rights afforded the media defendant and the rights
afforded the non-media defendant. The privilege belonged to the
citizen-critic and not the media-critic. In fact, the suggestion that the
protection of speech and press might be different is a fairly recent suggestion that, so far, is limited to the minds of only a few legal
scholars.1 19
In any event, no Supreme Court defamation case after New York
20
Times and before Gertz suggests that this is an important distinction.1
The Court in Gertz suggests the distinction but offers no rationale
121
whatsoever for it; the point is, there apparently is none.
118. 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
119. See FRANxLiN, Cases and Materials Mass Media Law 66-67 (1st ed. 1977);
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAsT. L.L 631 (1975); Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press
a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAST. L.J. 639 (1975);
Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. R-v.77 (1975); Nimmer, Speech
and Press: A Brief Reply, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 120 (1975).
120. It could be argued that the Rosenbloom plurality opinion speaks in terms of protection for the press rather than freedom of speech, but a thorough reading of the opinion reveals no clear suggestion that this is an important distinction.
121. Perhaps the best attempt to create a rational basis for such a distinction is Pro-
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The "ultimate expansion of Gertz to provide equal standards for
recovery against both media and non-media defendant seems predictable"' 22 if, in fact, one can call it an "expansion" at all. The wellestablished theory of our Constitution appears to be that "every citizen
may speak his mind and every newspaper express its view.' 12 The
case law clearly supports the view that the constitutional privilege is
as available to the non-media defendant as to the media defendant.
The historical approach to the defamation problem suggests a profound unwillingness to afford special rights to "the press." The traditional approach is that the lonely pamphleteer, the academic researcher, the novelist, the political pollster and the soap-box orator
24
possess the same first amendment rights as the established "press.'
The traditional approach is especially viable today; any person with
access to a Xerox copier machine has media power. As a practical
matter, in this technological age, we are all communications media.
The lower courts that have dealt directly with the question have
uniformly understood the Times doctrine to apply equally to media and
non-media defendants. 25 Thus, a speaker at a public rally, 126 a neighborhood grocery store owner 2 T and an individual complaining about
police burtality 28 have all been afforded the constitutional privilege.
The unmistakeable thrust of these and other cases is that the constitutional privilege is available to the non-media defendant.
In deciding to whom the constitutional privilege is available, it is
entirely inappropriate to distinguish the media from the non-media defendant. The fact that mass media defendants are likely to disseminate
their statements more widely than non-mass media defendants goes
directly to the issue of damages and not at all to the issue of whether
the privilege is available. Communications by people about people are
constitutionally protected, not just communications by the media.
fessor Dresser's article. Dresser, First Amendment Protections Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing Between Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAl. L. Rnv.
902 (1974); See also Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendments, 54 Tax. L.
Rav. 199 (1976).
122. Eaton, supra note 2, at 1417.
123. 376 U.S. 254, 299 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in result).
124. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972).
125. Eaton, supra note 2, at 1406.
126. Fox v. Kahn,421 Pa. 563, 221 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966).
127. Jaworsky v. Padfield, 211 So.2d 122 (La. 1968).
128. Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 (Del. 1971).
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THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
CONCLUSION

Compelling reasons support the notions that, for defamation

purposes, public people ought not to be distinguished from private
people and media defendants ought not to be distinguished from nonmedia defendants. The simple truth is that one's legal rights and obligations ought not to depend on one's status12 9 as a "public" person or
as a "media" person. No logical reasons exist to support the notion
that legally relevant distinctions ought to be drawn among victims of
defamation or among publishers of defamation.
In this analysis, the tort of defamation clearly takes on a constitutional dimension. A constitutional privilege belongs to each of us when
we communicate thoughts about other people. In this analysis, a
degree of success is achieved in reconciling the important competing
interests which favorably reflects the "culture, liberality and practical
ability" 130 of our technological age. A constitutional privileges31 is applied across the board and is not nibbled away. The common law maze
is avoided by offering constitutional protection for all communications
made by people about people.
If, as a practical matter, these distinctions were not drawn, the tort
of defamation would be stripped of many of the inconsistencies and
perverse rigidities which made the common law of defamation absurd
in theory and mischievous in practical application. A qualified privilege, grounded in the first amendment, would be available in every
defamation case.
In essence, defamation would very much resemble an intentional
tort. The injured plaintiff would have to prove with convincing clarity
that the defendant made a defamatory statement with "actual malice"
-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. If the plaintiff could prove this, she
129. Perhaps the one other area of the law where a person's status determines her
legal rights involves the rights of those who enter upon the land of another and are injured by a condition on the land. The common law approach was to afford varying degrees of protection to trespassers, licensees and invitees. For a thorough and convincing
critique of this approach to tort liability, see the famous case of Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
130. Veeder, supranote 1, at 546.
131. The author leaves for a subsequent article a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the particular privilege, based on the "actual malice" standard, that the Supreme Court has left with us.
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could recover nominal, compensatory and punitive damages. The "per
se/per quod" distinction would be discarded; the libel/slander distinction would be unnecessary. Along with them, the whole panoply of
damages-related problems would be obviated. The tort would have
a constitutional dimension, with proof of "actual malice" required for
all who complain of injury to their reputation.
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